The Foundational Cryptography Framework by Petcher, Adam & Morrisett, Greg
ar
X
iv
:1
41
0.
37
35
v1
  [
cs
.PL
]  
14
 O
ct 
20
14
The Foundational Cryptography Framework
Adam Petcher
Harvard University and MIT Lincoln Laboratory
apetcher@seas.harvard.edu
Greg Morrisett
Harvard University
greg@eecs.harvard.edu
Abstract
We present the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF) for
developing and checking complete proofs of security for crypto-
graphic schemes within a proof assistant. This is a general-purpose
framework that is capable of modeling and reasoning about a wide
range of cryptographic schemes, security definitions, and assump-
tions. Security is proven in the computational model, and the proof
provides concrete bounds as well as asymptotic conclusions. FCF
provides a language for probabilistic programs, a theory that is used
to reason about programs, and a library of tactics and definitions
that are useful in proofs about cryptography. The framework is de-
signed to leverage fully the existing theory and capabilities of the
Coq proof assistant in order to reduce the effort required to develop
proofs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors F.3.1 [LOGICS AND MEAN-
INGS OF PROGRAMS]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning
about Programs; D.3.1 [PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES]: For-
mal Definitions and Theory
Keywords Cryptography, Proof Assistant, Mechanized Proof,
Coq
1. Introduction
Cryptographic algorithms and protocols are becoming more numer-
ous, specialized, and complicated. As a result, it is likely that se-
curity vulnerabilities will slip by peer review. To address this prob-
lem, some cryptographers [6, 16] have proposed an increased level
of rigor and formality for cryptographic proofs. It is our hope that
eventually, cryptographers will be able to describe cryptographic
schemes and security proofs using a formal language, and the
proofs can be checked automatically by a highly trustworthy mech-
anized proof checker.
To enable such mechanically-verified proofs, we have devel-
oped The Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF). This
framework embeds into the Coq proof assistant [18] a simple
probabilistic programming language to allow the specification of
cryptographic schemes, security definitions, and assumptions. The
framework also includes useful theory, tactics, and definitions that
assist with the construction of proofs of security. Once complete,
the proof can be checked by the Coq proof checker. Facts proven
in FCF include the security of El Gamal encryption [14], and of
the encryption scheme described in Section 4 of this paper. We
have also proven the security of the “tuple-set” construction of
[10], which is a significant portion of a practical searchable sym-
metric encryption scheme. This is a complex and sophisticated
construction, and the proof requires over 7000 lines of Coq code
and includes a core argument involving more than 30 intermediate
games.
FCF is heavily influenced by CertiCrypt [4], which was later
followed by EasyCrypt [5]. CertiCrypt is a framework that is built
on Coq, and allows the development of mechanized proofs of
security in the computational model for arbitrary cryptographic
constructions. Unfortunately, proof development in CertiCrypt is
time-consuming, and the developer must spend a disproportion-
ate amount of time on simple, uninteresting goals. To address
these limitations, the group behind CertiCrypt developed Easy-
Crypt, which has a similar semantics and logic, and uses the Why3
framework and SMT solvers to improve proof automation. Easy-
Crypt takes a huge step forward in terms of usability and automa-
tion, but it sacrifices some trustworthiness due to that fact that the
trusted computing base is larger and the basis of the mechanization
is a set of axiomatic rules.
Following the release of EasyCrypt, a team of cryptographers
and programming language experts (including one of the authors
of this paper) attempted [17] to prove the security of a private
information retrieval system [13]. This effort did not produce a
complete proof because certain required facts could not be proven
in EasyCrypt. Specifically, it was impossible to prove particular
equivalences involving loop fusion and order permutation within
a loop. In order to allow these equivalences in EasyCrypt, it would
be necessary to prove them correct on paper and then modify the
EasyCrypt code to include appropriate rules. EasyCrypt has seen
significant improvements since its release, and it is possible that
these sorts of equivalence are now supported, but a developer may
encounter some other goal that EasyCrypt does not support.
FCF is a foundational framework like CertiCrypt, in which the
rules used to prove equivalence of programs (or any fact) are mech-
anized proofs derived from the semantics or other core definitions.
In such a framework, the problem of the previous paragraph can
be addressed by proving the appropriate theorem within the frame-
work, and then by using that theorem to obatain the desired equiva-
lence. An important difference between CertiCrypt and FCF is that
CertiCrypt uses a deep embedding of a probabilistic programming
language whereas FCF uses a shallow embedding (similar to [20]).
The shallow embedding allows us to easily extend the language,
and to make better use of Coq’s tactic language and existing auto-
mated tactics to reduce the effort required to develop proofs. The
result is a framework that is foundational and easily extensible, but
in which proof development effort is greatly reduced.
2. Design Goals
Based on our experience working with EasyCrypt, we formulated a
set of idealized design goals that a practical mechanized cryptogra-
phy framework should satisfy. We believe that FCF achieves many
of these goals, though there is still some room for improvement, as
discussed in Section 5.
Familiarity Security definitions and descriptions of cryptographic
schemes should look similar to how they would appear in cryptog-
raphy literature, and a cryptographer with no knowledge of pro-
gramming language theory or proof assistants should be able to
understand them. Furthermore, a cryptographer should be able to
inspect and understand the foundations of the framework itself.
Proof Automation The system should use automation to reduce
the effort required to develop a proof. Ideally, this automation is
extensible, so that the developer can produce tactics for solving
new kinds of goals.
Trustworthiness Proofs should be checked by a trustworthy pro-
cedure, and the core definitions (e.g., programming language se-
mantics) that must be trusted in order to trust a proof should be
relatively simple and easy to understand.
Extensibility It should be possible to directly incorporate any
existing theory that has been developed for the proof assistant. For
example, it should be possible to directly incorporate an existing
theory of lattices in order to support cryptography that is based on
lattices and their related assumptions.
Concrete Security The security proof should provide concrete
bounds on the probability that an adversary is able to defeat the
scheme. Concrete bounds provide more information than asymp-
totic statements, and they inform the selection of values for system
parameters in order to achieve the desired level of security in prac-
tice.
Abstraction The system should support abstraction over types,
procedures, proofs, and modules containing any of these items.
Abstraction over procedures and primitive types is necessary for
writing security definitions, and for reasoning about adversaries in a
natural way. The inclusion of abstraction over proofs and structures
adds a powerful mechanism for developing sophisticated abstract
arguments that can be reused in future proofs.
Code Generation The system should be able to generate code
containing the procedures of the cryptographic scheme that was
proven secure. This code can then be used for basic testing, proto-
typing, or as an executable model to which future implementations
will be compared during testing.
3. Framework Components
In a typical cryptographic proof, we specify cryptographic schemes,
security definitions, and (assumed) hard problems, and then we
prove a reduction from a properly-instantiated security definition
to one or more problems that are assumed to be hard. In other
words, we assume the existence of an effective adversary against
the scheme in question, and then prove that we can construct a
procedure that can effectively solve a problem that is assumed to
be hard. This reduction results in a contradiction that allows us
to conclude that an effective adversary against the scheme cannot
exist.
The cryptographic schemes, security definitions, and hard prob-
lems are probabilistic, and FCF provides a common probabilistic
programming language (Section 3.1) for describing all three. Then
we provide a denotational semantics (Section 3.1) that allows rea-
soning about the probability distributions that correspond to pro-
grams in this language. This semantics assigns a numeric value to
an event in a probability distribution, and it also allows us to con-
clude that two distributions are equivalent and we can replace one
with the other (which supports the game-hopping style of [6]).
It can be cumbersome to work directly in the semantics, so we
provide an equational theory (Section 3.2) of distributions that can
be used to prove that distributions are related by equality, inequal-
ity or “closeness.” A program logic (Section 3.3) is also provided
to ease the development of proofs involving state or looping behav-
ior. To reduce the effort required to develop a proof, the framework
provides a library of tactics (Section 3.4) and a library of com-
mon program elements with associated theory (Section 3.5). The
equational theory, program logic, tactics, and programming library
greatly simplify proof development, yet they are all derived from
the semantics of the language, and using them to complete a proof
does not reduce the trustworthiness of the proof.
By combining all of the components described above, a devel-
oper can produce a proof relating the probability that some adver-
sary defeats the scheme to the probability that some other adversary
is able to solve a problem that is assumed to be hard. This is a re-
sult in the concrete setting, in which probability values are given as
expressions, and certain problems are assumed to be hard for par-
ticular constructed adversaries. In such a result, it may be necessary
to inspect an expression describing a probability value to ensure it
is sufficiently “small,” or to inspect a procedure to ensure it is in the
correct complexity class. FCF provides additional facilities to ob-
tain more traditional asymptotic results, in which these procedures
and expressions do not require inspection. A set of asymptotic def-
initions (Section 3.6) allows conclusions like “this probability is
negligible” or “this procedure executes a polynomial number of
queries.” In order to apply an assumption about a hard problem, it
may be necessary to prove that some procedure is efficient in some
sense. So FCF provides an extensible notion of efficiency (Section
3.7) and a characterization of non-uniform polynomial time Turing
machines.1
3.1 Probabilistic Programs
We describe probabilistic programs using Gallina, the purely func-
tional programming language of Coq, extended with a computa-
tional monad in the spirit of Ramsey and Pfeffer [21], that supports
drawing random bit vectors from an input tape. Listing 1 contains
an example of a valid FCF program that implements a one-time
pad using bit vectors. This program accepts a bit vector argument
x, samples a random bit vector of length c (where c is a constant
declared outside of this function) and assigns the result to variable
p, then returns p⊕ x.
Definition OTP (x : Bvector c) : Comp (Bvector c)
:= p <-$ {0, 1}ˆc; ret (p xor x)
Listing 1. An Example of a Probabilistic Program
The syntax of the language is defined by an inductive type
called Comp and is shown in Listing 2. At a high-level, Comp is an
embedded domain-specific language that inherits the host language
Gallina, and extends it with operations for generating and working
with random bits.
Inductive Comp : Set -> Type :=
| Ret : forall {A : Set}{H: EqDec A},
A -> Comp A
| Bind : forall {A B : Set},
Comp B -> (B -> Comp A) -> Comp A
| Rnd : forall n, Comp (Bvector n)
| Repeat : forall {A : Set},
Comp A -> (A -> bool) -> Comp A.
Listing 2. Probabilistic Computation Syntax
The most notable primitive operation is Rnd, which produces n
uniformly random bits. The Repeat operation repeats a compu-
tation until some decidable predicate holds on the value returned.
This operation allows a restricted form of non-termination that is
sometimes useful (e.g., for sampling natural numbers in a specified
range). The operations Bind and Ret are the standard monadic
constructors, and allow the construction of sequences of compu-
tations, and computations from arbitrary Gallina terms and func-
tions, respectively. However, note that the Ret constructor requires
1 The current release of the FCF code for version 8.4 of Coq is included as
auxiliary material.
a proof of decidable equality for the underlying return type, which
is necessary to provide a computational semantics as seen later in
this section. In the remainder of this paper, we will use a more nat-
ural notation for these constructors: {0, 1}n is equivalent to (Rnd
n), x $← c; f is the same as (Bind c (fun x ⇒ f), and
ret e is (Ret e). The framework includes an ASCII form of
this notation as seen in Listing 1. In the case of Ret, the notation
serves to hide the proof of decidable equality, which is irrelevant to
the programmer and is usually constructed automatically by proof
search.
FCF uses a shallow embedding, in which functions in the ob-
ject language are realized using functions in the metalanguage. In
contrast, CertiCrypt uses a deep embedding, in which the data type
describing the object language includes constructs for specifying
and calling functions, as well as all of the primitives such as bit-
vectors and xor.
We have found that there are key benefits to shallow embed-
ding. The primary benefit is that we immediately gain all of the
capability of the metalanguage, including (in the case of Coq) de-
pendent types, higher-order functions, modules, etc. Another ben-
efit is that it is very simple to include any necessary theory in a
security proof, and all of the theory that has been developed in the
proof assistant can be directly utilized. One benefit that is specific
to Coq (and other proof assistants with this property) is that Gal-
lina functions are necessarily terminating, and Coq provides some
fairly complex mechanisms for proving that a function terminates.
By combining this restriction on functions with additional restric-
tions on Repeat, we can ensure that a computation (eventually)
terminates, and that this computation corresponds with a distribu-
tion in which the total probability mass is 1.
On the other hand, the shallow embedding approach does have
some drawbacks. The main drawback is that a Gallina function
is opaque; we can only reason about a Gallina function based
on its input/output behavior. The most significant effect of this
limitation is that we cannot directly reason about the computational
complexity of a Gallina function. We address this issue in Section
3.7.
Jret aK = 1{a}
Jx
$
← c; f xK = λx.
∑
b∈supp(JcK)
(Jf bK x) ∗ (JcK b)
J{0, 1}nK = λx. 2−n
JRepeat c P K = λx.(1P x) ∗ (JcK x) ∗
(∑
b∈P
(JcK b)
)−1
Figure 1. Semantics of Probabilistic Computations
The denotational semantics of a probabilistic computation is
shown in Figure 1. The denotation of a term of type Comp A is a
function in A → Q which should be interpreted as the probability
mass function of a distribution on A. In Figure 1, 1S is the indicator
function for set S. So the denotation of ret a is a function that
returns 1 when the argument is definitionally equal to a, and 0
otherwise. We can view the denotation of x $← c; f c as a marginal
probability of the joint distribution formed by c and f . We know
the probability of all events in c, but we only know the probability
of events in f conditioned on events in c, so we can compute
the probability of any event in this marginal distribution using
the law of total probability. The fact that random bits are uniform
and independent is encoded in the denotation of {0, 1}n, which
is a function that ignores the argument and returns the probability
that any n-bit value is equal to a randomly chosen n-bit value.
The probability that Repeat c P produces x is the conditional
probability of x given P in c—which is equivalent to the function
shown in Figure 1.
It is important to note that this language is purely functional,
but the monadic style gives programs an imperative appearance.
This appearance supports the Familiarity design goal since crypto-
graphic definitions and games are typically written in an imperative
style.
It is sometimes necessary to include some state in a crypto-
graphic definition or proof. This can be easily accomplished by
layering a state monad on top of Comp. However, this simple ap-
proach does not allow the development of definitions in which an
adversary has access to an oracle that must maintain some hidden
state across multiple interactions with the adversary. The definition
could not simply pass the state to the adversary, because then the
adversary could inspect or modify it. So FCF provides an extension
to Comp for probabilistic procedures with access to a stateful ora-
cle. The syntax of this extended language (Listing 3) is defined in
another inductive type called OracleComp, where OracleComp
A B C is a procedure that returns a value of type C, and has access
to an oracle that takes a value of type A and returns a value of type
B.
Inductive OracleComp :
Set -> Set -> Set -> Type :=
| OC_Query : forall (A B : Set),
A -> OracleComp A B B
| OC_Run : forall (A B C A’ B’ S : Set),
EqDec S -> EqDec B -> EqDec A ->
OracleComp A B C -> S ->
(S -> A -> OracleComp A’ B’ (B * S)) ->
OracleComp A’ B’ (C * S)| OC_Ret : forall A B C,
Comp C -> OracleComp A B C
| OC_Bind : forall A B C C’,
OracleComp A B C ->
(C -> OracleComp A B C’) ->
OracleComp A B C’.
Listing 3. Computation with Oracle Access Syntax
The OC Query constructor is used to query the oracle, and
OC Run is used to run some program under a different oracle
that is allowed to access the current oracle. The OC Bind and
OC Ret constructors are used for sequencing and for promoting
terms into the language, as usual. In the rest of this paper, we
overload the sequencing and ret notation in order to use them for
OracleComp as well as Comp. We use query and run, omitting
the additional types and decidable equality proofs, as notation for
the corresponding constructors of OracleComp.
Jquery aK = λo s.(o s a)
Jrun c′ o′ s′K = λo s.Jc′(λx y.J(o′(fst x) y) o (snd x)K) (s′, s)K
Jret cK = λo s.x $← c; ret (x, s)
Jx
$
← c; f xK = λo s.[x, s′]
$
← Jc o sK; J(f x) o s′K
Figure 2. Semantics of Computations with Oracle Access
The denotation of an OracleComp is a function from an oracle
and an oracle state to a Comp that returns a pair containing the value
provided by the OracleComp and the final state of the oracle.
The type of an oracle that takes an A and returns a B is (S -> A
-> Comp(B * S)) for some type S which holds the state of the
oracle. The denotational semantics is shown in Figure 2.
3.2 (In)Equational Theory of Distributions
A common goal in a security proof is to compare two distribu-
tions with respect to some particular value (or pair of values) in
the distributions. To assist with such goals, we have provided an
(in)equational theory for distributions. This theory contains facts
that can be used to show that two probability values are equal,
that one is less than another, or that the distance between them
is bounded by some value. For simplicity of notation, equality is
overloaded in the statements below in order to apply to both nu-
meric values and distributions. When we say that two distribu-
tions (represented by probability mass functions) are equal, as in
D1 = D2, we mean that the functions are extensionally equal, that
is ∀x, (D1 x) = (D2 x).
Theorem 1 (Monad Laws).
Ja
$
← ret b; faK = J(f b)K
Ja
$
← c;ret aK = JcK
Ja
$
← (b
$
← c1; c2 b); c3 aK = Jb
$
← c1; a
$
← c2 b; c3 aK
Theorem 2 (Commutativity).
Ja
$
← c1; b
$
← c2; c3 a bK = Jb
$
← c2; a
$
← c1; c3 a bK
Theorem 3 (Distribution Irrelevance). For any well-formed com-
putation c,
(∀x ∈ supp(JcK), Jf xKy = v)⇒ Ja
$
← c; f aKy = v
Theorem 4 (Distribution Isomorphism). For any f which is a bijec-
tion from supp(Jc2K) to supp(Jc1K),
∀x ∈ supp(Jc2K), Jc1K(f x) = Jc2Kx
∧ ∀x ∈ supp(Jc2K), Jf1 (f x)K v1 = Jf2 xKv2
⇒ Ja
$
← c1; f1 aK v1 = Ja
$
← c2; f2 aK v2
Theorem 5 (Identical Until Bad).
Ja
$
← c1;ret (B a)K = Ja
$
← c2;ret (B a)K ∧
Ja
$
← c1;ret (P a,B a)K(x, false) =
Ja
$
← c2;ret (P a,B a)K(x, false)⇒
| Ja
$
← c1;ret (P a)K x− Ja
$
← c2;ret (P a)K x | ≤
Ja
$
← c1; ret (B a)K true
The meaning and utility of many of the above theorems is direct
(such as the standard monad properties in Theorem 1), but others
require some explanation. Theorem 3 considers a situation in which
the probability of some event y in Jf xK is the same for all x
produced by computation c. Then the distribution JcK is irrelevant,
and it can be ignored. This theorem only applies to well-formed
computations: A well-formed computation is one that terminates
with probability 1, and therefore corresponds to a valid probability
distribution.
Theorem 4 is a powerful theorem that corresponds to the com-
mon informal argument that two random variables “have the same
distribution.” More formally, assume distributions Jc1K and Jc2K as-
sign equal probability to any pair of events (f x) and x for some
bijection f . Then a pair of sequences beginning with c1 and c2 are
denotationally equivalent as long as the second computations in the
sequences are equivalent when conditioned on (f x) and x. A spe-
cial case of this theorem is when f is the identity function, which
allows us to simply “skip” over two semantically equivalent com-
putations at the beginning of a sequence.
Theorem 5, also known as the “Fundamental Lemma” from
[6], is typically used to bound the distance between two games by
the probability of some unlikely event. Computations c1 and c2
produce both a value of interest and an indication of whether some
“bad” event happened. We use (decidable) predicate B to extract
whether the bad event occurred, and projection P to extract the
value of interest. If the probability of the “bad” event occurring in
c1 and c2 is the same, and if the distribution of the value of interest
is the same in c1 and c2 when the bad event does not happen, then
the distance between the probability of the value of interest in c1
and and c2 is at most the probability of the “bad” event occurring.
3.3 Program Logic
The final goal of a cryptographic proof is always some relation
on probability distributions, and in some cases it is possible to
complete the proof entirely within the equational theory described
in 3.2. However, when the proof requires reasoning about loops or
state, a more expressive theory may be needed in order to discharge
some intermediate goals. For this reason, FCF includes a program
logic that can be used to reason about changes to program state
as the program executes. Importantly, the program logic is related
to the theory of probability distributions through completeness and
soundness theorems which allow the developer to derive facts about
distributions from program logic facts, and vice-versa.
The core logic is a Probabilistic Relational Postcondition Logic
(PRPL), that behaves like a Hoare logic, except there are no pre-
conditions. The definition of a PRPL specification is given in Def-
inition 1. In less formal terms, we say that computations p and q
are related by the predicate Φ if both p and q are marginals of the
same joint probability distribution, and Φ holds on all values in the
support of that joint distribution.
Definition 1 (PRPL Specification). Given p : Comp A and q :
Comp B, p ∼ q{Φ} iff,
∃ (d : Comp (A * B)),∀(x, y) ∈ supp(JdK),Φ x y ∧
JpK = Jx
$
← d;ret (fst x)K ∧ JqK = Jx $← d;ret (snd x)K
Using the PRPL, we can construct a Probabilistic Relational
Hoare Logic (PRHL) which includes a notion of precondition for
functions that return computations as shown in Definition 2. The
resulting program logic is very similar to the Probabilistic Rela-
tional Hoare Logic of EasyCrypt [5], and it has many of the same
properties.
Definition 2 (PRHL Specification). Given p : A -> Comp B and
q : C -> Comp D, {Ψ}p ∼ q{Φ} iff, ∀a b,Ψ a b ⇒ (p a) ∼
(q b){Φ}.
Several theorems are provided along with the program logic def-
initions to simplify reasoning about programs. In order to use the
program logic, one only needs to apply the appropriate theorem, so
it is not necessary to produce the joint distribution described in the
definition of a PRPL specification unless a suitable theorem is not
provided. Theorems are provided for reasoning about the basic pro-
gramming language constructs, interactions between programs and
oracles, specifications describing equivalence, and the relationship
between the program logic and the theory of probability distribu-
tions. Some of the more interesting program logic theorems are
described below.
Theorem 6 (Soundness/Completeness w.r.t. Equality).
p ∼ q{λ a b.a = x⇔ b = y} ⇔ JpK x = JqK y
Theorem 7 (Soundness/Completeness w.r.t. Inequality).
p ∼ q{λ a b.a = x⇒ b = y} ⇔ JpK x ≤ JqK y
Theorem 8 (Sequence Rule).
p ∼ q{Φ′} ⇒ {Φ′}r ∼ s{Φ} ⇒
(x
$
← p; r x) ∼ (x
$
← q; s x){Φ}
Theorem 9 (Oracle Equivalence). Given an OracleComp c, and a
pair of oracles, o and p with initial states s and t,
Φ = λ x y.(fst x) = (fst y) ∧ P (snd x)(snd y)⇒(
∀a s′ t′, P s′ t′ ⇒ (o s′ a) ∼ (p t′ a){Φ}
)
⇒
P s t⇒ (JcK o s) ∼ (JcK p t){Φ}
Theorems 6 and 7 relate judgments in the program logic to re-
lations on probability distributions. The forward direction (sound-
ness) is typically used in a proof to transform the goal into the pro-
gram logic in order to accurately reason about loops and/or state.
Once the goal is in the program logic, the backward direction (com-
pleteness) can be used to return to a goal about distributions, or
to apply an existing theorem that describes relations on probabil-
ity distributions. Theorem 8 is the relational form of the standard
Hoare logic sequence rule, and it supports the decomposition of
program logic judgments.
Theorem 9 allows the developer to replace some oracle with an
observationally equivalent oracle. This theorem takes a relational
invariant P on the states of the oracles, and requires the developer
to prove that if P holds on the states of the oracles and they are
given identical input, then P holds on the resulting states and the
outputs are identical. As long as P holds on the initial state of
the oracle, this theorem concludes that the values returned by the
program interacting with the oracles are equal, and that P holds
on the final state. There is also a more general form of this theorem
(omitted for brevity) in which the state of the oracle is allowed to go
bad, and the interaction only produces equivalent results if the state
does not go bad. This more general theorem can be combined with
Theorem 5 to get “identical until bad” results for program/oracle
interactions.
3.4 Tactics
The framework includes several tactics that can be used to trans-
form goals using the facts in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. For example,
the comp swap l tactic applies commutativity (Theorem 2) to
swap two independent statements at the beginning of the program
on the left (of the equality, inequality, or program logic specifi-
cation) in the current goal. There are similar tactics for manip-
ulating games based on Left Identity (comp ret), Associativity
(comp inline), Distribution Irrelevance (comp irr), and the
special case of Distribution Isomorphism in which the bijection is
the identity function (comp skip). Many of these tactics can be
applied to goals related to probability distributions as well as goals
in the program logic.
A tactic called dist compute is provided to automatically
discharge goals involving simple computations for which the cor-
responding distribution obviously has some desired property—
typically that the probability of some event equals some specific
value. A common proof technique is to develop a program in
which the probability value of a particular event is obvious, and
then relate other programs to this one by equivalence proofs. Then
dist compute can be used to automatically compute the desired
probability value for this program. The tactic works by producing
an arithmetic expression from the computation(s) and then per-
forming case splits in appropriate ways in order to get goals that
can be solved automatically by existing Coq decision procedures
(such as intuition and omega).
3.5 Programming Library
The framework includes a library containing useful programming
structures and their related theory. For example, the library includes
several sampling routines, such as drawing a natural number from a
specified range; drawing an element from a finite list, set, or group;
or sampling an arbitrary Bernoulli distribution. These sampling
routines are all computations based on the Rnd statement provided
by the language, and each routine is accompanied by a theory
establishing that the resulting distribution is correct and has the
desired properties.
The CompFold package contains higher-order functions for
folding and mapping a computation over a list. This package uses
the program logic extensively, and many of the theorems take
a specification on a pair of computations as an argument, and
produce a specification on the result of folding/mapping those
computations over a list. The package also contains theorems about
typical list and loop manipulations such as appending, flattening,
fusion/fission and order permutation.
3.6 Asymptotic Theory
The bulk of the effort in a security proof will be spent obtaining
some result in the concrete setting. From there, a little more ef-
fort is required to produce a proof of some asymptotic fact that
one would typically encounter in cryptography literature. To en-
able such asymptotic definitions and proofs, FCF includes a library
of standard asymptotic definitions such as Definitions 3 and 4. The
library also includes theorems that can be used to prove that func-
tions are polynomial or negligible based on their composition(e.g.,
the sum of polynomials is polynomial, the quotient of polynomial
and exponential is negligible).
Definition 3 (At Most Polynomial). A function f : N → N is at
most polynomial iff ∃x c1 c2,∀n, f(n) ≤ c1 ∗ nx + c2
Definition 4 (Negligible Function). A function f : N → Q is
negligible iff ∀c,∃n,∀x > n, f(x) < 1/xc
3.7 Efficient Procedures
A typical asymptotic security property states that a family of cryp-
tographic schemes has some desirable property for all efficient ad-
versaries. So in order to prove and apply these properties, we re-
quire some notion of “efficient” (families of) procedures. The lan-
guage of computations used in FCF does not imply any particular
model of computation—it is just a mechanism to specify proba-
bility distributions in a computational manner. Any notion of “ef-
ficiency” must first fix a model of computation, and then a com-
plexity class on that model. We want this notion of efficiency to be
flexible and extensible, so we can support several different models
of computation and complexity classes.
To accomplish this flexibility, we parameterize asymptotic secu-
rity definitions by an “admissibility predicate” indicating the class
of adversaries against which a problem is assumed to be hard, or
a scheme is proven to be secure. In this setting, the adversary is a
family of procedures indexed by a natural number which indicates
the value of the security parameter. The admissibility predicate can
describe the efficiency of the adversary as well as other properties
such as well-formedness or the number of allowed oracle queries
as a function of the security parameter.
FCF includes a simple cost model and an associated admissibil-
ity predicate describing non-uniform worst-case polynomial time
Turing machines that perform a (worst case) polynomial number
of oracle queries. This admissibility predicate is constructed us-
ing a concrete cost model that assigns numeric costs to particu-
lar Coq functions, Comp values, and OracleComp values. In this
cost model, the cost of executing a function is in N, indicating the
worst-case (over all arguments) execution time. The cost of running
a Comp is in N, indicating the worst-case execution time over all
outcomes. The cost of executing an OracleComp is in N → N,
and is a function from the cost of executing the oracle to the cost
of executing the computation, including the cost of executing all
oracle queries.
The cost model for Gallina functions is axiomatic, as there is
no direct way to capture such an intensional property for these
terms. Our cost model includes axioms for primitive operations
as well as a set of combinators for building more complicated
functions. For example, the model includes an axiom stating that
the xor operation for bit vectors of length c has a cost of c. As
other examples, the model includes axioms stating that the cost of
f composed with g is the sum of the costs of f and g, and the cost
of if e1 then e2 else e3 is the cost of e1 plus the maximum of
the costs of e2 and e3. Obviously, our cost axioms are incomplete,
but in practice, the number required is relatively small since it is
only necessary to reason about the functions used by a constructed
adversary in a proof. Of course, the axioms need to be carefully
inspected to ensure they accurately describe the desired complexity
class.2 But of course, a similar kind of inspection is needed to
ensure the faithfullness of a cost model for a deeply-embedded
language.
3.8 Code Extraction
FCF provides a code extraction mechanism that includes a strong
guarantee of equivalence between a model of a probabilistic pro-
gram and the code extracted from that model. The denotational se-
mantics of probabilistic computations relates a computation to a
probability distribution, but it does not contain sufficient informa-
tion to allow us to reason about the behavior of such computations
on a traditional computer. So we developed a small-step operational
semantics that describes the behavior of these computations on a
machine in which the memory contains values rather than proba-
bility distributions. The operational semantics (omitted for brevity)
is an oracle machine that is given a finite list of bits representing the
“random” input, and it describes how a computation takes a single
step to produce a new computation, a final value, or fails due to
insufficient input bits.
To show that this semantics is correct, we consider [c]n, the mul-
tiset of results obtained by running a program c under this seman-
tics on the set of all input lists of length n. We can view [c]n as a
distribution, where the mass of some value a in the distribution is
the proportion of input strings that cause the program to terminate
with value a. In order to compare the operational semantics with the
denotational semantics, we want to view the operational semantics
as a relation between computations and distributions. So the dis-
tribution related to computation c by the operational semantics is
limn→∞[c]n. The statement of equivalence between the semantics
is shown in Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. If c is well-formed, then
lim
n→∞
[c]n = JcK
FCF contains a proof of Theorem 10 as a validation of the
operational semantics used for extraction, but this theorem also
provides other benefits. Because limits are unique, if two programs
are equivalent under the operational semantics, then they are also
equivalent under the denotational semantics. This allows us to
prove equivalence of two programs using the operational semantics
when it is more convenient to do so. For example, theorems related
2 Furthermore, a proof that a Gallina term has a cost described by these
axioms does not mean that the extracted OCaml code will have this com-
plexity, but rather, there exists some (propositionally) equivalent term which
has the described cost. Since we are only trying to show the existence of an
effective procedure, this is sufficient for our purposes.
to unrolling Repeat statements are trivial to prove under the
operational semantics.
Another benefit of the operational semantics and proof of equiv-
alence is that this semantics can be considered to be the basic se-
mantics for computations, and the denotational semantics no longer
needs to be trusted. Some may prefer this arrangement, since the
operational semantics more closely resembles a typical model of
computation, and may be easier to understand and inspect. The op-
erational semantics can also be used as a basis for a model of com-
putation used to determine whether programs are efficient.
Now that we have an operational semantics, we can simply use
the standard Coq extraction mechanism to extract it along with the
model of interest and all supporting types and functions. Of course,
the trustworthiness of the extracted code depends on the correct-
ness of Coq’s extraction mechanism. Gallina does not allow infinite
recursion, so the framework includes OCaml code that runs a com-
putation under the operational semantics until a value is obtained.
The final step is instantiating any abstract types and functions with
appropriate OCaml code. This extraction mechanism does not pro-
duce production-quality code, but the code could be used for pur-
poses related to prototyping and testing.
4. Security Proof Construction
This section uses an example to describe the process of construct-
ing a proof of security using the general process described at the
beginning of Section 3. We consider a simple encryption scheme
constructed from a pseudorandom function (PRF), and we prove
that ciphertexts produced by this scheme are indistinguishable un-
der chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA). These security definitions,
and the formal description of the construction, are provided in later
sub-sections.
This example proof is relatively simple, yet it contains many
elements that one would find in a typical cryptographic argument,
and so it allows us to exercise all of the key functionality of the
framework. A more complex mechanized proof (e.g., the proof
of [10]) may have more intermediate games and a different set
of arguments to justify game transformations, but the structure is
similar to the proof that follows.
4.1 Concrete Security Definitions
In FCF, security definitions are used to describe properties that
some construction is proven to have, as well as problems that
are assumed to be hard. In the PRF encryption proof, we use
the definition of a PRF to assume that such a PRF exists, and
we use that assumption to prove that the construction in question
has the IND-CPA property. A concrete security definition typically
contains some game and an expression that describes the advantage
of some adversary – i.e., the probability that the adversary will
“win” the game.
The game used to define the concrete security of a PRF is
shown in Listing 4. Less formally, we say that f is a PRF for some
adversary A, if A cannot effectively distinguish f from a random
function. So this means that we expect that PRF Advantage is
“small” as long as A is an admissible adversary.
The function f oracle simply puts the function f in the form
of an oracle, though a very simple one with no state and with
deterministic behavior. The procedure RndR func is an oracle
implementing a random function constructed using the provided
computation RndR. The expressions involving A use a coercion in
Coq to invoke the denotational semantics for OracleComp, and
therefore ensure that A can query the oracle but has no access to the
state of the oracle.
At a high level, this definition involves two games describing
two different “worlds” in which the adversary may find himself.
In one world (PRF G A) the adversary interacts with the PRF,
Variable Key D R : Set.
Variable RndKey : Comp Key.
Variable RndR : Comp R.
Variable A : OracleComp D R bool.
Variable f : Key -> D -> R.
Definition f_oracle(k : Key)
(x : unit)(d : D) : Comp (R * unit) :=
ret (f k d, tt).
Definition PRF_G_A : Comp bool :=
k <-$ RndKey;
[b, _] <-$2 A (f_oracle k) tt;
ret b.
Definition PRF_G_B : Comp bool :=
[b, _] <-$2 A (RndR_func) nil;
ret b.
Definition PRF_Advantage :=
| Pr[PRF_G_A] - Pr[PRF_G_B] |.
Listing 4. PRF Concrete Security Definition
and in the other (PRF G B) the adversary interacts with a random
function. In each game, the adversary interacts with the oracle and
then outputs a bit. The advantage of the adversary is the difference
between the probability that he outputs 1 in world PRF G A and the
probability that he outputs 1 in world PRF G B. If f is a PRF, then
this advantage should be small.
The concrete security definition for IND-CPA encryption is
shown in Listing 5. In this definition, KeyGen and Encrypt are
the key generation and encryption procedures. The adversary com-
prises two procedures, A1 and A2 with different signatures, and the
adversary is allowed to share arbitrary state information between
these two procedures. This definition uses a slightly different style
than the PRF definition—there is one game and the “world” is cho-
sen at random within that game. Then the adversary attempts to
determine which world was chosen.
In Listing 5, the game produces an encryption oracle from
the Encrypt function and a randomly-generated encryption key.
Then the remainder of the game, including the calls to A1 and A2,
may interact with that oracle. The code for this definition includes
some additional notation (different arrows and extra $ symbols)
that is only used to provide hints to the Coq parser and does not
change the behavior of the program.
4.2 Construction
The construction, like the security definitions, can be modeled in a
very natural way. Of course, one must take care to ensure that the
construction has the correct signature as specified in the desired
security property. The PRF encryption construction is shown in
Listing 6.
In the PRF Encryption construction, we assume a nat called
eta (η) which will serve as the security parameter. The encryption
scheme is based on a function f, and the scheme will only be secure
if f is a PRF. The type of keys and plaintexts is bit vectors of
length eta, and the type of ciphertexts is pairs of these bit vectors.
The decryption function is included for completeness, but it is not
needed for this security proof.
4.3 Sequence of Games
The sequence of games represents the overall strategy for complet-
ing the proof. In the case of PRF Encryption, we want to show
that the probability that the adversary will correctly guess the ran-
domly chosen “world” is close to 1/2. We accomplish this by instan-
tiating the IND-CPA security definition with the construction, and
then transforming this game, little by little, until we have a game in
Variable Plaintext Ciphertext Key State : Set.
Variable KeyGen : Comp Key.
Variable Encrypt : Key -> Ciphertext ->
Comp Plaintext.
Variable A1 : OracleComp Plaintext Ciphertext
(Plaintext * Plaintext * State).
Variable A2 : State -> Ciphertext ->
OracleComp Plaintext Ciphertext bool.
Definition EncryptOracle
(k : Key)(x : unit)(p : Plaintext) :=
c <-$ Encrypt k p;
ret (c, tt).
Definition IND_CPA_SecretKey_G :=
key <-$ KeyGen ;
[b, _] <-$2
(
[p0, p1, s_A] <--$3 A1;
b <--$$ {0, 1};
pb <- if b then p1 else p0;
c <--$$ Encrypt key pb;
b’ <--$ A2 s_A c;
$ ret eqb b b’
)
(EncryptOracle key) tt;
ret b.
Definition IND_CPA_SecretKey_Advantage :=
| Pr[IND_CPA_SecretKey_G] - 1 / 2 |.
Listing 5. IND-CPA Concrete Security Definition
Variable eta : nat.
Variable f : Bvector eta ->
Bvector eta -> Bvector eta.
Definition PRFE_KeyGen :=
{0, 1} ˆ eta.
Definition PRFE_Encrypt
(k : Key )(p : Plaintext) :=
r <-$ {0, 1} ˆ eta;
ret (r, p xor (f k r)).
Definition PRFE_Decrypt
(k : Key)(c : Ciphertext) :=
(snd c) xor (f k (fst c)).
Listing 6. Encryption using a PRF
which this probability is exactly 1/2. Each transformation may add
some concrete value to the bounds, and we want to ensure that the
sum of these values is small.
The diagram in Figure 3 shows the entire sequence of games, as
well as the relationship between each pair of games in the sequence.
In this diagram, two games are related by = if they are identical,
and by ≈ if they are close. When the equivalence is non-trivial, the
diagram gives an argument for the equivalence, which implies a
bound on the distance between the games when they are not equal.
A detailed description of each game transformation follows:
1. Instantiate the IND-CPA definition with the construction. Un-
fold definitions and simplify. (Listing 7)
2. Apply the PRF definition to replace the PRF with a random
function. (Listing 8)
3. Replace the random function output used to encrypt the chal-
lenge ciphertext with a bit vector selected completely at ran-
dom. With overwhelming probability, the adversary does not
notice this change. (Listing 9)
IND GPA G = G1
≈PRF Advantage
G2
≈Random List Collision
G3
=One Time Pad
G4 = G5 = 1/2
Figure 3. Sequence of Games Diagram
4. We have modified the game to the point that encryption of the
challenge plaintext is by one-time pad. So we can replace the
ciphertext with a randomly-chosen value. (Listing 10)
5. Now the ciphertext is independent from the plaintext, and thus
independent from the random bit that was used to select the
“world.” This means we can move this coin flip to after the ad-
versary guesses which world he is in. In this game, it is obvious
that the probability that the adversary guesses the correct out-
come of the coin flip is exactly one half. (Listing 11)
Definition G1 :=
key <-$ PRFE_KeyGen;
[b, _] <-$2
(
[p0, p1, s_A] <--$3 A1;
b <--$$ {0, 1};
pb <- if b then p1 else p0;
c <--$$ PRFE_Encrypt key pb;
b’ <--$ (A2 s_A c);
$ ret (eqb b b’)
)
(PRFE_EncryptOracle key) tt;
ret b.
Listing 7. Game 1
Definition PRFE_RandomFunc := @randomFunc
(Bvector eta) (Bvector eta) ({0,1}ˆeta) _.
Definition RF_Encrypt s p :=
r <-$ {0, 1} ˆ eta;
[pad, s] <-$2 PRFE_RandomFunc s r;
ret (r, p xor pad, s).
Definition G2 :=
[a, o] <-$2 A1 (RF_Encrypt) nil;
[p0, p1, s_A] <-3 a;
b <-$ {0, 1};
pb <- if b then p1 else p0;
[c, o] <-$2 RF_Encrypt o pb;
[b’, o] <-$2 (A2 s_A c) RF_Encrypt o;
ret (eqb b b’).
Listing 8. Game 2
4.4 Equivalence Proofs
The next step is to prove the appropriate sort of equivalence be-
tween each pair of games in the sequence. In the case of PRF En-
cryption, the goal is to show that the distance between the IND-CPA
Definition G3 :=
[a, o] <-$2 A1 (RF_Encrypt) nil;
[p0, p1, s_A] <-3 a;
b <-$ {0, 1};
pb <- if b then p1 else p0;
r <-$ {0, 1}ˆeta;
pad <-$ {0, 1}ˆeta;
c <- (r, pb xor pad);
[b’, o] <-$2 (A2 s_A c) RF_Encrypt o;
ret (eqb b b’).
Listing 9. Game 3
Definition G4 :=
[a, o] <-$2 A1 (RF_Encrypt) nil;
[p0, p1, s_A] <-3 a;
b <-$ {0, 1};
pb <- if b then p1 else p0;
r <-$ {0, 1}ˆeta;
pad <-$ {0, 1}ˆeta;
c <- (r, pad);
[b’, o] <-$2 (A2 s_A c) RF_Encrypt o;
ret (eqb b b’).
Listing 10. Game 4
Definition G5 :=
[a, o] <-$2 A1 (RF_Encrypt) nil;
[p0, p1, s_A] <-3 a;
r <-$ {0, 1}ˆeta;
pad <-$ {0, 1}ˆeta;
c <- (r, pad);
[b’, o] <-$2 (A2 s_A c) RF_Encrypt o;
b <-$ {0, 1};
ret (eqb b b’).
Listing 11. Game 5
game and 1/2 is very small, and we accomplish this by showing that
each pair of games in the sequence is either identical or “close.”
The first step is to show that Game 1 (Listing 7) really is the
IND-CPA game instantiated with this encryption scheme. This fact
(Listing 12) is obvious, and the proof can be completed using Coq’s
reflexivity tactic. A1 and A2 are parameters representing the
procedures of the adversary against the encryption scheme. In the
statement of this theorem, == is equality for rational numbers. This
equality is registered with Coq’s setoid system to enable tactics
such as reflexivity and rewriting.
Theorem G1_equiv :
Pr[IND_CPA_SecretKey_G PRFE_KeyGen PRFE_Encrypt
A1 A2] == Pr[G1].
Listing 12. Equivalence of the Security Definition and Game 1
Next we show that the distance between Games 1 and 2 is ex-
actly the advantage of some adversary against a PRF. The adver-
sary against the PRF (Listing 13) is constructed from A1 and A2.
PRFE Encrypt OC is an encryption oracle that interacts with the
PRF as an oracle. PRF A provides this encryption oracle to A1 and
A2 using the OC Run operation.
To prove the “closeness” of Games 1 and 2, first we prove that
the interaction between PRF A and the PRF oracle is equivalent to
Game 1 (Theorem 14). Then we prove that the interaction between
PRF A and the random function oracle is equivalent to Game 2
(Theorem 15). Finally we apply the results of parts 1 and 2 and
unify with the definition of a PRF (Theorem 16).
To prove Theorems 14 and 15, we mostly perform simple
manipulations such as applying the denotational semantics of
OracleComp, inlining, and removing identical statements at the
beginning of the game. In both of these proofs, the adversary is
Definition PRFE_Encrypt_OC (x : unit)
(p : Plaintext) : OracleComp (Bvector eta)
(Bvector eta) (Ciphertext * unit) :=
r <--$$ {0, 1} ˆ eta;
pad <--$ OC_Query r;
$ (ret (r, p xor pad, tt)).
Definition PRF_A : OracleComp (Bvector eta)
(Bvector eta) bool :=
[a, n] <--$2 OC_Run A1 PRFE_Encrypt_OC tt;
[p0, p1, s_A] <-3 a;
b <--$$ {0, 1};
pb <- if b then p1 else p0;
r <--$$ {0, 1} ˆ eta;
pad <--$ OC_Query r;
c <- (r, pb xor pad);
z <--$ OC_Run (A2 s_A c) PRFE_Encrypt_OC n;
[b’, _] <-2 z;
$ ret (eqb b b’).
Listing 13. The Constructed Adversary Against the PRF
Theorem G1_PRF_A_equiv :
Pr[k <-$ {0, 1}ˆ eta;
[b, _] <-$2 PRF_A (f_oracle k) tt;
ret b] == Pr[G1].
Listing 14. Equivalence PRF A and G1
Theorem G2_PRF_A_equiv :
Pr[[b, _] <-$2 PRF_A PRFE_RandomFunc nil;
ret b] == Pr[G2].
Listing 15. Equivalence PRF A and G2
Theorem G1_G2_close : | Pr[G1] - Pr[G2] | ==
PRF_Advantage ({0, 1}ˆeta) ({0, 1}ˆeta)
f PRF_A.
Listing 16. Closeness of Game 1 and Game 2
interacting with two different, but observationally equivalent, or-
acles. So we use the program logic and Theorem 9 to prove that
these interactions produce equivalent results.
Next we show that Games 2 and 3 are “close” by demonstrating
that these games are “identical until bad” in the sense of Theorem
5. The “bad” event of interest is the event that the randomly-
generated PRF input used to encrypt the challenge plaintext (r
in Game 2) is also used to encrypt some other value during the
interaction between the adversary and the encryption oracle. There
are two separate adversary procedures, and each one is capable
of encountering r during its interaction with the oracle. So we
divide this proof into two parts, one for each adversary procedure,
where each part includes an “identical until bad” argument. In the
first step, we produce the pad value randomly (without using the
random function), but then add an entry for r and pad to the
state of the random function. In the second step, we produce pad
randomly, and do not add an entry to the random function.
To get an expression for the probability of the “bad”event, we
assume natural numbers q1 and q2, and that A1 performs at most
q1 queries and A2 performs at most q2 queries. FCF includes a
library module called RndInList that includes general-purpose
arguments related to the probability of encountering a randomly
selected value in a list of a certain length, and the probability
of encountering a certain value in a list of randomly-generated
elements of a certain length. By combining the “identical until
bad” proofs with these arguments to get expressions bounding the
probabilities of the bad events, we obtain the result of Listing 17.
The next step is to use a one-time-pad argument to replace the
challenge ciphertext with a randomly-chosen value. The library
contains a generic one-time-pad argument that we can apply here.
Theorem G2_G3_close :
| Pr[G2] - Pr[G3] | <=
q1 / (2 ˆ eta) + q2 / (2 ˆ eta).
Listing 17. Closenes of Game 2 and Game 3
We transform this game into an equivalent game that unifies with
the one-time-pad argument, then we apply the argument to get the
result shown in Listing 18.
Theorem G3_G4_equiv : Pr[G3] == Pr[G4].
Listing 18. Equivalence of Game 3 and Game 4
Now that the ciphertext is independent of the challenge bit, we
produce a new game by moving the sampling of the challenge bit
to the end of the game. To prove this fact (Listing 19), we simply
unfold the required definitions, skip over all of the identical pairs
of statements at the beginning of the proof, then swap the order of
independent statements in the game on the left in order to make
these statements align with the identical statements in the game on
the right.
Theorem G4_G5_equiv :
Pr[G4] == Pr[G5].
unfold G4, G5.
do 3 (comp_skip; comp_simp; comp_swap_l).
comp_skip; comp_simp.
reflexivity.
Qed.
Listing 19. Equivalence of Game 4 and Game 5
Finally, we develop the proof that the adversary wins Game
5 with probability exactly 1/2. This proof (Listing 20) proceeds
by discarding all of the initial statements in the game using the
comp irr l tactic. Note that this tactic produces an obligation to
prove that the statement being discarded is a well-formed compu-
tation, which can be discharged with the tactic wftac. Then what
remains is a very simple game, and dist compute can automat-
ically compute the probability that this game returns true.
Theorem G5_one_half :
Pr[G5] == 1/2.
do 4 comp_irr_l; wftac.
dist_compute.
Qed.
Listing 20. Probability of Winning Game 5
By combining the equivalences of each pair of intermediate
games, we get the final concrete security result shown in Listing 21.
It is important to note that the statement of this theorem does not
reference any of the intermediate games. The sequence of games
was only a tool that we used to get the final result, and this sequence
does not need to be inspected in order to trust the result.
The concrete security result in Listing 21 may be sufficient for
many purposes. We have an expression describing the advantage of
the adversary, and we can inspect this expression to see whether this
advantage is sufficiently small. We also must inspect the definition
of the adversary PRF A, which appears in this result, and ensure
that this adversary is “efficient” according to the desired complex-
ity class. Next we will show how to derive an asymptotic security
result based on this concrete result. A benefit of proving asymp-
totic security is that this proof removes the requirement to inspect
the constructed adversary and the expression describing the adver-
sary’s advantage.
Theorem PRFE_IND_CPA_concrete :
IND_CPA_SecretKey_Advantage PRFE_KeyGen
PRFE_Encrypt A1 A2 <=
PRF_Advantage ({0, 1}ˆeta) ({0, 1}ˆeta)
f PRF_A + (q1 / 2ˆeta + q2 / 2ˆeta).
Listing 21. Concrete Security Result
4.5 Asymptotic Security Definitions
Now we give the asymptotic security definitions for PRFs and IND-
CPA encryption. These definitions are parameterized by an admis-
sibility predicate as described in Section 3.7. The IND-CPA defini-
tion accepts two admissibility predicates – one for each adversary
procedure.
The asymptotic security definition for a PRF is given in List-
ing 22. In this definition, RndKey, RndR, and f are nat-indexed
families of procedures. Similarly in the IND-CPA definition (List-
ing 23), KeyGen and Encrypt are nat-indexed families of pro-
cedures. Both of these definitions are claims over all admissible
nat-indexed adversary families. Note that both definitions reuse
the expressions provided in the concrete security definitions. This
style provides a convenient method for developing an asymptotic
security proof from a concrete security proof.
Variable D R Key : nat -> Set.
Variable RndKey : forall n, Comp (Key n).
Variable RndR : forall n, Comp (R n).
Variable f : forall n, Key n -> D n-> R n.
Definition PRF :=
forall (A : \forall n, OracleComp (D n) (R n)
bool), admissible_A A ->
negligible (fun n => PRF_Advantage
(RndKey n) (RndR n) (@f n) (A n)).
Listing 22. Definition of a PRF
Variable Plaintext Ciphertext Key State :
nat -> Set.
Variable KeyGen : forall n, Comp (Key n).
Variable Encrypt : forall n, Key n ->
Ciphertext n -> Comp (Plaintext n).
Definition IND_CPA_SecretKey :=
forall (State : nat -> Set)
(A1 : forall n, OracleComp (Plaintext n)
(Ciphertext n)
(Plaintext n * Plaintext n * State n))
(A2 : forall n, State n -> Ciphertext n ->
OracleComp (Plaintext n) (Ciphertext n)
bool),
admissible_A1 A1 ->
admissible_A2 A2 ->
negligible
(fun n => IND_CPA_SecretKey_Advantage
(KeyGen n) (@Encrypt n) (A1 n) (A2 n) ).
Listing 23. Definition of IND-CPA Encryption
4.6 Efficiency of Constructed Adversaries
The first step in proving an asymptotic security result is to view
each constructed adversary in the concrete proof as a nat-indexed
family of adversaries, and prove that this family is “efficient” as
defined by some complexity class. In the PRF Encryption proof, we
use the non-uniform polynomial time complexity class described
in Section 3.7. Because this class includes a concrete cost model,
we begin with a proof of the concrete cost of each constructed
adversary procedure.
We begin by assuming costs for A1 and A2. A1 cost is a func-
tion describing the cost of A 1. A2 cost 1 is a number describ-
ing how much it costs for A2 to compute an OracleComp that is
closed over a state and a ciphertext. Then A2 cost 2 is a function
describing the cost of executing this OracleComp. Given these
assumptions, we can give a cost to PRF A as shown in Listing 24. In
the statement of this theorem, oc cost, comp cost, and cost
are the cost models for OracleComp, Comp, and Coq functions,
respectively. Note that this cost model is overly conservative and
some costs are counted multiple times.
Theorem PRF_A_cost :
oc_cost cost (comp_cost cost) PRF_A
(fun x => (A1_cost (x + (5 * eta))) +
(A2_cost_2 (x + (5 * eta))) +
x + 5 * A2_cost_1 + 6 + 7 * eta).
Listing 24. Cost of Constructed Procedure PRF A
This proof is completed by repeatedly applying the rule of the
cost model that is relevant to the term in the goal, which is a highly
syntax-directed operation that can be mostly automated. Once all
these syntax-directed rules are applied, the developer is obligated
to prove that the expression obtained in this process is equal to (or
less than) the expression in the statement of the theorem. In this last
step of the proof, automated tactics such as omega are very useful.
4.7 Asymptotic Security Proof
The final step in the proof is to show that the security defi-
nition shown in Listing 23 holds on this construction as long
as f is a PRF as defined in Listing 22. The statement of this
fact is shown in Listing 25. Note that admissible oc and
admissible oc func 2 are the admissibility predicates for
OracleComp and for functions with two arguments that produce
an OracleComp defined in the simple complexity class described
in Section 3.7.
Theorem PRFE_IND_CPA :
PRF Rnd Rnd f (admissible_oc cost) ->
IND_CPA_SecretKey
PRFE_KeyGen (fun n => PRFE_Encrypt (@f n))
(admissible_oc cost)
(admissible_oc_func_2 cost).
Listing 25. Asymptotic Security of PRF Encryption
The primary obligation of this proof is to show that the function
defining the advantage of any admissible family of adversaries
against this encryption scheme is a negligible function. The fact
that this adversary family is admissible allows us to use the result of
Listing 24, along with other facts, to conclude that the constructed
adversary family against the PRF is admissible. In the course of
this proof, we must show that the expression implied by Figure 24
is at most polynomial in η if x is at most polynomial in η and all
the costs related to PRF A1 and PRF A2 are at most polynomial
in η. This fact is proven using the provided theory of polynomial
functions (Section 3.6).
From the admissibility of the constructed adversary, and from
the fact the f is a PRF against all admissible adversaries, we can
conclude that the constructed adversary’s advantage against the
PRF is negligible. The advantage of this adversary against the PRF
is one of the terms that appears in the bounds of the concrete result
(Listing 21). The other term is q1/2η + q2/2η , where q1 and q2
are the number of oracle queries performed by the two adversary
procedures. The admissibility predicates ensure that each adversary
only performs a polynomial number of queries, so q1 and q2 must
be polynomial in η, and this expression is negligible in η. So the
advantage of the adversary against this encryption scheme is the
sum of two negligible functions, and is therefore negligible.
The entire proof of security for this encryption scheme requries
approximately 1500 lines of Coq code, of which about 700 lines
are specification (including 100 lines of cryptographic definitions
and intermediate games) and 800 lines are proof. The proof incor-
porates another 500 lines of code for the reusable arguments (e.g.,
the one-time pad argument). We expect that a skilled Coq devel-
oper could complete such a proof in a matter of days (though he
may require the help of a cryptographer to develop the sequence of
games and high-level arguments).
5. Evaluation
This section attempts to evaluate FCF against the design goals
listed in Section 2, and to contrast with both CertiCrypt and Easy-
Crypt.
All three of these frameworks provide concrete bounds, so this
criterion is not discussed further. And, all three frameworks use a
relatively familiar syntax for security definitions and constructions.
We believe that, based on our experience working with cryptog-
raphers, they can easily understand these definitions (e.g., Listing
4) after spending a few minutes familiarizing themselves with the
notation.
Regarding proof automation, FCF lies somewhere between Cer-
tiCrypt and EasyCrypt. EasyCrypt achieves a significant level of
automation by using SMT solvers to discharge simple logical goals,
but higher-level goals still need to be addressed manually by ap-
plying tactics. FCF achieves a similarly high level of automation
through the use of existing and custom Coq tactics. These tac-
tics are not as powerful as modern SMT solvers, so the devel-
oper may need to manually address some goals in FCF that would
be discharged automatically in EasyCrypt. However, the seman-
tics of programs in FCF is computational, so Coq is able to im-
mediately compute an expression describing the probability dis-
tribution for any program. This allows some simple equivalences
to be discharged immediately using this computation and FCF’s
dist compute tactic.
Regarding trust in extensional properties, FCF and CertiCrypt
are foundational, meaning that the program logic is constructed
definitionally from the semantics. In contrast, EasyCrypt relies
upon a set of axioms for its program logic. EasyCrypt also relies
on the correctness of the EasyCrypt front end and the Why3 ver-
ification generator, whereas FCF and CertiCrypt only depend on
the Coq type checker. EasyCrypt provides no support for reason-
ing about intensional properties like execution time, whereas Cer-
tiCrypt and FCF do, though FCF provides this suport using a trusted
set of axioms.
EasyCrypt and CertiCrypt are based on simply-typed, first-order
languages. This design makes it difficult to directly support abstrac-
tion, extension, and reuse, though these frameworks include ele-
ments which support these goals to some extent. In contrast, FCF
uses a shallow embedding and the advanced features of Coq, such
as dependent types, modules, notation, and higher-order functions,
to support abstraction, extensiblity, and reuse. We believe that hav-
ing such a rich language for describing games and assumptions is
critical for scaling to larger protocols.
FCF supports code generation with a semantics that is proven to
be equivalent to the semantics used to reason about the probabilis-
tic behavior of programs. That is, a program extracted from an FCF
model is guaranteed to produce the correct probability distribution
when the input bits provided to it are uniformly distributed, assum-
ing the extraction mechanism of Coq preserves meaning. There has
been some initial work in producing implementations that corre-
spond to EasyCrypt models, but there is no formal relationship be-
tween the semantics of the implementation and the semantics used
to reason about the model.
6. Related Work
There has been a large amount of work in the area of verifying
cryptographic schemes in recent years. In this section we will de-
scribe some of this related work, focusing on systems that attempt
to establish security in the computational model. CertiCrypt [4] and
EasyCrypt [5] have been thoroughly discussed previously in this
paper.
There are several other examples of frameworks for crypto-
graphic security proofs implemented within proof assistants. The
most similar work is that of Nowak [20], who was the first to de-
velop proofs of cryptography in Coq using a shallow embedding
in which programs have probability distributions as their denota-
tions. FCF builds on this work by adding more tools for modeling
and reasoning such as procedures with oracle access (Section 3.1),
a program logic (Section 3.3), and asymptotic reasoning (Section
3.6).
The work of [2] is a Coq library utilizing a deeply-embedded
imperative programming language. This library is a predecessor to
CertiCrypt, and it includes some important elements that were later
adopted by CertiCrypt. Notably, the probabilistic programming lan-
guage in this work is given a semantics in which program states are
distributions, and the semantics describes how these distributions
are transformed by each command in the language. CertiCrypt and
EasyCrypt extended this work by adding language constructs such
as oracles and unrestricted loops, and well as reasoning tools such
as the Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic.
Verypto [8] is a fully-featured framework built on Isabelle [19]
that includes a deep embedding of a functional programming lan-
guage. To allow state information to remain hidden from adver-
saries, Verypto provides ML-style references, in contrast to the or-
acle system provided by FCF. To date, Verypto has only been used
to prove the security of simple constructions, but this work uses an
interesting approach that deserves more exploration.
CryptoVerif [9] is a tool based on a concurrent, probabilistic
process calculus that is only able to prove properties related to
secrecy and authenticity. CryptoVerif is highly automated to the
extent that it will even attempt to locate intermediate games, and so
proof development in CryptoVerif requires far less effort compared
to FCF or EasyCrypt. However, there are a large number of proofs
that could be completed in FCF or EasyCrypt that are impossible
in CryptoVerif due to its specialized nature.
Refinement types [7] have been used by Fournet et al [15] to
develop proofs of security for cryptographic schemes in the com-
putational model. In this system, a security property is specified as
an ideal functionality (in the sense of the real/ideal paradigm), and
proofs are completed using the “sequence of games” style in the
asymptotic setting. This approach allows the proofs of security to
be fairly simple, but no concrete security claims are proved, so it
may be difficult to make practical claims based on such a proof.
Computational soundness [1] provides another mechanism for
verifying cryptographic schemes. This approach attempts to derive
security in the computational model from security in the symbolic
model by showing that any likely execution trace in the compu-
tational model also exists in the symbolic model. It is possible to
mechanize such a proof as described in [3]. This approach is lim-
ited to classes of schemes for which computational soundness re-
sults have been discovered. Another limitation with this approach
is that it can only produce proofs in the asymptotic setting—there
is no way to prove concrete security claims.
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [12] provides a logic and
proof system for verifying cryptographic schemes in the symbolic
model. The system is based on a process calculus and allows rea-
soning about the results of individual protocol steps. More recent
work [11] has extended this logic to allow for proofs in the com-
putational model. In computational PCL, formulas are interpreted
against probability distributions on traces and a formula is true if
it holds with overwhelming probability. This approach is similar to
computational soundness in that low-probability traces are ignored,
and proofs of concrete security claims are impossible.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Our contribution is a complete mechanized framework for specify-
ing and checking cryptographic proofs within a proof assistant. Our
framework compares favorably to the current state of the art, and
provides many new benefits, such as extensibility through a founda-
tional approach, a powerful language for describing schemes, and
the ability to extract excutable code. Of course, whether these ben-
efits apply at scale is still an open question, and thus a key direction
for us is to prove security for an even wider range of standard con-
structions, as well as novel cryptographic schemes. In particular,
we have proven the security of the “tuple set” construction of [10],
and we intend to continue developing this work into a proof of a
searchable symmetric encryption scheme.
The biggest limitation of FCF is that it currently lacks defini-
tions for many cost models and complexity classes that are com-
monly used in cryptography. We hope to develop more cost mod-
els and complexity classes, including a complexity class describing
(uniform) probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines.
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